

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA  
MONROE DIVISION**

**RAYNARD L. BRADFORD  
LA. DOC #485036**

**VS.**

**CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-cv-2947  
SECTION P**

**JUDGE DONALD E. WALTER**

**MS. KILNARD, ET AL.**

**MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES**

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

*Pro se* plaintiff Raynard L. Bradford, proceeding *in forma pauperis*, filed the instant civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 on November 20, 2012. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of Louisiana's Department of Corrections. He is currently incarcerated at the Winn Correctional Center; however, when he filed this suit he was incarcerated at the Morehouse Parish Jail (MPJ). He complains that Ms. Kilnard, the nurse at MPJ, denied him appropriate mental health care and attention which resulted in self inflicted injury to his person. He prays for compensatory damages. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636 and the standing orders of the Court. For the following reasons it is recommended that the complaint be **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE** as frivolous and for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

***Background***

Plaintiff entered into custody at MPJ sometime in July 2012 having been transferred from another facility in West Carroll Parish. Upon his departure from the latter prison he advised its warden and dispatcher that he "was having some mental issue and [needed] to be seen by a

doctor for depression and also suicidal thoughts ..." At some point after his arrival at MPJ he wrote to the nursing staff "complaining about harming myself." The nurse placed him on suicide watch for a period of seven days. At the end of those seven days, and having observed no suicidal behavior, the nurse summoned plaintiff to her office and advised him that he would be taken off of suicide watch and confined to lock down.

While in lock down, plaintiff somehow obtained a razor blade and cut himself with it. He was thereafter examined and treated by a physician. He faults Nurse Kilnard for having left the facility prior to his self mutilation and placing him in the care of another nurse who tended to his wounds. Plaintiff also faults Kilnard for improperly documenting these events in his medical chart and for her "unprofessional attitude and rude behavior."

Plaintiff seeks compensation for the pain and suffering "caused by vindictive and unprofessional behavior while in a stressful environment" and for being "... forced to cooperate against [his] will in order to get seen by the Doctor the second time after being rejected..."

On January 10, 2013, plaintiff advised that he was transferred from MPJ to Winn Corrections Center.

### *Law and Analysis*

#### ***1. Screening***

When a prisoner is allowed to proceed *in forma pauperis* in a suit against an officer or employee of a governmental entity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, the court is obliged to evaluate the complaint and dismiss it without service of process, if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A; 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2). *Ali v. Higgs*, 892 F.2d 438,

440 (5th Cir.1990). A civil rights complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Of course, in making this determination, the court must assume that all of the plaintiff's factual allegations are true. *Bradley v. Puckett*, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir.1998).

A civil rights plaintiff must support his claims with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(A court should begin its analysis by "identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."); *Schultea v. Wood*, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir.1995). Nevertheless, a district court is bound by the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint and is "not free to speculate that the plaintiff 'might' be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint." *Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153*, 23 F.3d at 97.

A hearing need not be conducted for every *pro se* complaint. *Wilson v. Barrientos*, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n. 4 (5th Cir.1991). A district court may dismiss a prisoner's civil rights complaint as frivolous based upon the complaint and exhibits alone. *Green v. McKaskle*, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir.1986).

Courts are not only vested with the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but are also afforded the unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual

allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. *Neiztke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Plaintiff's complaint, while short on factual support, adequately sets forth his claim for relief; further amendment is not necessary.

## **2. Medical Care**

The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that the decision to take him off of "suicide watch" after seven days was incorrect and resulted in his subsequent self mutilation while he was confined in lock down.

The constitutional right of a convicted prisoner to safe conditions of confinement and prompt and adequate medical care is based upon the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Rights guaranteed under the Eighth Amendment are violated only if the defendants act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm which results in injury. Deliberate indifference requires that the defendants have subjective knowledge of the risk of harm. Mere negligence or a failure to act reasonably is not enough. The defendants must have the subjective intent to cause harm. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).

Thus, in order to establish an actionable constitutional violation a plaintiff must allege facts tending to establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and safety. *Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas*, 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir.2001). A showing of deliberate indifference with regard to medical treatment requires the inmate to submit evidence that prison officials "refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard

for any serious medical needs.' " *Domino v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice*, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). Plaintiff's pleadings fall far short of alleging facts sufficient to establish deliberate indifference on the part of any of the defendants identified in his pleadings. As a matter of fact, it is manifestly obvious that plaintiff simply disagrees with the decisions of the health care professionals who were responsible for his treatment. Plaintiff's disagreement with their treatment choices falls far short of establishing deliberate indifference since mere disagreement with medical diagnosis or treatment does not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See *Norton v. Dimazana*, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir.1997), citing *Young v. Gray*, 560 F.2d 201, 201 (5th Cir.1977); *Spears v. McCotter*, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1985).

Furthermore, deliberate indifference is not the equivalent of negligence; deliberate indifference "describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence." *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Under the deliberate indifferent standard, it is not sufficient that defendants should have known of a substantial risk; they must have actual knowledge of the risk and must thereafter have ignored it. In other words, a civil rights plaintiff must allege and prove that each of the defendants knew of and then disregarded an excessive risk of injury to him, and, that they were both aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and that they drew that inference. *Id.* at 837.

In short, plaintiff's failure to allege and demonstrate deliberate indifference warrants dismissal of his complaint as frivolous and for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

***Conclusion and Recommendation***

Therefore,

**IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT** plaintiff's civil rights complaint be **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE** as frivolous and for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing.

**Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error.**

*See, Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996).*

In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, January 23, 2013.



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KAREN L. HAYES  
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE